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Abstract: We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement 
of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid 
designators. 
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We are told that Tully and Cicero were one and the same person. But how could 
that be for it is necessarily true that if ‘Tully=Cicero’ is true then ‘Tully’ and 
‘Cicero’ refer to the same entity. And since ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ are rigid 
designators, being proper names of Tully and Cicero, ‘Tully = Cicero’ is 
necessarily true. But if ‘Tully = Cicero’ is necessarily true then ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ 
necessarily refer to the same entity.1 But no distinct pair of proper names refer 
jointly necessarily to any entity. For no proper name implies another or names 
its bearer necessarily. Hence, Tully and Cicero need not have been one and the 
same person and therefore could not have been one and the same person.2Which 
of course is absurd. 
The argument assumes two classical theses of Kripke, that proper names 
are rigid designators3 and that any statement of the form ‘a=b’ is necessarily true, 
if ‘a=b’ is true and ‘a’ and ‘b’ are rigid designators.4 The argument would have 
significant force even if it would turn out that ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ are not rigid 
designators. For we have a proof for the second premise,5 and the argument 
shows independently of the first premise that if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid 
designators no statement of the form “‘a=b’ is necessarily true,” is true. 
We now turn to the claim that no proper name refers necessarily to its 
bearer. ‘Tully’ or ‘Cicero’ is in fact our name for Tully. But clearly we could have 
used the names ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ to name distinct entities or to name someone 
other than Tully. Or, in model theoretic terms, there is a possible world in which 
the proper names ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ as used in that  world refer to distinct 
entities. But given Kripke’s two classical theses, this cannot be (Appendix step 
4).6 
                                                        
1 We restate the argument from ‘Tully=Cicero’ is true, in more detail in the appendix. 
2 A consequence of the theorem that if an identity is possibly false then it’s necessarily false. 
3 See Kripke (1980, 6, 40-9). For the theory in the making see Kripke (1971, 140, 143, 145). 
4 See Kripke (1971, 140, 144-5), Kripke (1980, 3). 
5 See Kripke (1971, 140), Kripke (1980, 3), and Burgess (2014, 1577).   
6 I am deeply grateful to Laureano Luna for his intense correspondence on the paper. I must 
also thank Yehuda Gellman, Peter Genco and Asa Kasher for the conversations over the years 
on Kripke. 
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 Appendix 
1.  ‘Tully=Cicero’ is true                                                                                    Assumption 
2.  [‘Tully=Cicero’ is true  ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ refer to the same entity] 
Assumption 
3.  ‘Tully=Cicero’ is true   ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ refer to the same entity’         2, K 
4.  ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ refer to the same entity                                                           3, 1 
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